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INTRODUCTION

It is said that fame impacts all areas of one's life. This holds
true with legal proceedings as well. American courts allow for trials
of celebrities such as O.J. Simpson, Claus von Bulow, and Phil
Spector to be public. The irony is that these trials often make the
defendants more famous and, in the process, profitable. Consider the
2011 trial of Casey Anthony. After Anthony was acquitted for the
murder of her young daughter, rumors quickly swirled that she had
been offered a book contract. 2 Had Anthony not become a public
figure during her legal ordeal, she would not have had such a
contract. Further, she could have returned to living a relatively
normal life after being acquitted. In cases like this, pseudonymity, or
name suppression, would serve to prevent defendants from
profiting - or suffering - from their notoriety.

While litigation-related name suppression is relatively
uncommon in the United States, it plays a larger role in the legal
systems of other countries. New Zealand arguably has one of the
most liberal litigation-related name suppression policies in the
Western world. Suppression allows for parties to take part in legal
proceedings while avoiding having their names become part of the
public record. Compared to its allies England and Australia, New
Zealand is far more lenient in allowing for name suppression for
plaintiffs, defendants, and victims. 3 Although permanent suppression is somewhat unusual,4 temporary suppression is granted on a
regular basis, more so than in these ally countries and more so than
in the United States.5
Yet changes to New Zealand's longstanding name
suppression policy are afoot. In October 2011, the Criminal Procedure
2

John Hudson, Casey Anthony Signs a Book Deal at her Peril,THE ATLANTIC

WIRE

(July 18, 2011), http://www.theatlanticwire.com/business/2011/07/casey-anthonysigns-book-deal-her-peril /40108/.
Simon Power, Government Makes Name Suppression Harder to Get, BEEHIVE.
GovT.NZ (Oct. 5, 2010), http://www.beehive.govt.nz/release/government-makesname-suppression-harder-get.
4 See Tv The Queen [2010] NZCA 438 (CA).
See, e.g., C v Dir. of Human Rights Proceedings (unreported) High Court,
Auckland, CIV-2010-404-001662, 6 September 2010, Venning J (N.Z); LNC v SX
(2008) 24/08 HRRT 1/08.
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Act 2011 was enacted. 6 This legislation amends many of New
Zealand's standard legal procedures; one such change is that it makes
name suppression less readily available while still being objective
and humane.7 Parts of the Act, including the portions dealing with
name suppression, were implemented in 2012; the Act in its entirety
will be in place by the end of 2013.8
In this article, I will briefly explore the differences in the
previous legislation and the new revisions, as well as the latter's
impact. I will also examine the history, values, and rationale behind
New Zealand's name suppression policy. In doing so, I conclude that
New Zealand's method appropriately balances privacy concerns and
open justice. The United States should adopt, or at least move
towards, a similar model for its own legal system.
II. NEW ZEALAND'S NAME SUPPRESSION: A UNIQUE APPROACH FROM
INFORMAL BEGINNINGS

New Zealand has no formal constitution. 9 Instead, the rights
of the people derive from sources such as legislation, custom, and
parliamentary procedure. 10 One of this democracy's most vital
documents is the New Zealand Bill of Rights."
Nothing in Bill of Rights addresses name suppression
directly. The most relevant part, section 14, provides that "Everyone
has the right to freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek,
receive, and impart information and opinions of any kind in any
form." 12 The term "freedom to seek" suggests that one can
permissibly search for information of any sort, including names of
parties connected to legal proceedings that may have initially been
6

Ministry

of

Justice,

Summary

of

Changes

in

Criminal Procedure,

http://justice.govt.nz/courts/modernising-courts/new-criminal-procedure/summaryof-changes (last visited Dec. 20, 2012) (summarizing the changes the new legislature
will implement).
7 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.) (Sections 200 208 address name suppression).
8 Ministry of Justice, supra note 6.
9 2 MEDIA, ADVERTISING,

AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW THROUGHOUT THE WORLD

§27:2 (Andrew B. Ulmer ed., 2011).
10Id.

1 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.
12Id. § 14.
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withheld by courts. Section 14 is often cited in media law cases in
which the identities of the parties are sought.1 3 However, the freedom
provided by this section is tempered by section 5, Justified Limitations, which subjects all of the Bill's rights and liberties to "reasonable
limits." 14
New Zealand's Privacy Act also does not directly address
name suppression. Principle 11 within the Act places limits on the
disclosure of information, but does not mention the disclosure of
information in the context of legal proceedings.15 Whether Principle
11's silence on a topic should be interpreted as inclusive or exclusive
has not been addressed, so there is a legitimate argument that the
language of this section is applicable to litigation settings.
Conversely, the Immigration Act explicitly addresses name
suppression, albeit briefly. 16 Where the Act defines courts' and
tribunals' obligations in regards to classified information, it permits
these bodies to forbid publication of witnesses' names or identifying
information.17 The publication of defendants' and plaintiffs' names,
however, is not addressed.
More definitive treatment of name suppression can be found
in New Zealand's Criminal Justice Act 1985.18 That legislation gave
courts the discretion to suppress the names of plaintiffs, defendants,
and anyone else associated with any legal proceedings;19 the courts
also were allowed to determine whether such suppression, when
granted, should be temporary or permanent. 20 The Act stated that
"[t]he making under this section of an order having effect only for a
limited period shall not prevent any court from making under this
section any further order having effect either for a limited period or
permanently."21

13 Ulmer, supra

14New

note 9, at 1.

Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 at § 5.

Privacy Act 1993 (N.Z.) at § 6.
Act 2009 (N.Z.) at § 259.
'7 Id. at § 259(6).
" Criminal Justice Act 1985 (N.Z.) §§ 138-141 (repealed 2012).
1

16 Immigration

'9Id. § 140(4).
20

id

21 id.
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The Criminal Justice Act 1985 has been repealed due to the
enactment of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011,22 and while name
suppression is addressed in the new legislation,23 modifications have
been made. Name suppression was an aspect of law that faced major
revisions, and those revisions were among the first to take effect. 24
The impact is that suppression will be granted less liberally than it
was in the past. Instead of providing "broad discretion for granting
of suppression," 25 as the law previously did, the new legislation uses
open justice as the starting point for any consideration of
suppression. 26
Nine sections of the new act address various rules relating to
name suppression, 27 and one section specifically provides grounds
for which it may be granted for defendants. 28 Under the new act,
name suppression will be granted only in cases where publication
would probably:
(a) cause extreme hardship to the person charged with, or
convicted of, or acquitted of the offence, or any person
connected with that person; or
(b) cast suspicion on another person that may cause undue
hardship to that person; or
(c) cause undue hardship to any victim of the offence; or
(d) create a real risk of prejudice to a fair trial; or
(e) endanger the safety of any person; or
(f) lead to the identification of another person whose name is
suppressed by order or by law; or
(g) prejudice the maintenance of the law, including the
prevention, investigation, and detection of offences; or
(h) prejudice the security or defence of New Zealand. 29

Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.).
Id. §§ 200 208.
24 Ministry of Justice, supra
note 6.
22
2

3

25

id.

26

id

Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.) §§ 200-208.
Id. § 200.
29 id.
27
28

64
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These provisions continue to allow decision-makers to
exercise a certain amount of flexibility when analyzing suppression
requests, so long as courts provide their reasons for granting, lifting,
or changing an order for suppression.3 0 They allow for courts to
decide whether something causes undue hardship, whether
something is unfairly prejudicial, and so forth. In addition, the
legislation allows a defendant to argue that he or she meets one of
these conditions.31 If the court agrees, it can choose to make an
interim suppression order; 32 however, it can also lift an order -even a
permanent one-at any time.33 In balancing all of the factors and
differences, the 2011 rule is more stringent than the 1985 rule. The
older act did not contain any of the mandates that the new one
does.3 4
III. A LIBERAL AND BETTER APPROACH
New Zealand's
rationale for name suppression is
straightforward: certain types of allegations, even if later disproved
or dismissed, can permanently harm a person's reputation and
livelihood. 35 Indeed, this harm may be the sort of "extreme
hardship" 36 that the new act looks to avoid placing on accused
parties. And yet freedom of speech and transparency of the court
system are vital components of a modern democracy as well.3 7 How
to balance these public policy interests is an ongoing concern38 for
which temporary suppression seemingly provides a compromise. It
protects a defendant's identity while a case is in progress, but if the

30

Id § 207.
§ 200(4).

31 Id.

Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.) at § 200(5).
Id. § 208.
34 Criminal Justice Act 1985 (N.Z.) does not specify reasons for suppression; but cf
Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.) § 200, which provides specific circumstances
that warrant suppression.
3 M. Bismark & R. Paterson, Medical Malpractice: Naming, Blaming and Shaming?, 25 MED. & L. 115, 115 (2006).
36 Criminal Justice Act 2011 § 200(2).
3 Bismark & Paterson, supra note 35, at 115.
32

38

id.
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person is convicted, his or her name becomes part of the public
record.
The starting point for any suppression inquiry is the prima
facie assumption that publication is permissible and that the
openness of the legal system is highly desired. 39 Courts weigh several
factors in determining whether to override this assumption. These
include the following:
*
*
*
*

*

The final disposition of a case. Suppression is more likely
to be granted for acquittals than for convictions. 40
The seriousness of the offense. The greater the gravity of
the crime, the higher the likelihood of publication. 41
The likelihood of a convicted criminal's rehabilitation. 42
The extent of public interest in the requestor's character.
Such an interest has been demonstrated in cases involving
sex offense, drug use, and dishonesty. 43
The requestor's personal circumstances. Any damage that
publication would cause must be more serious than the
standard degree of embarrassment or distress.44

These factors are measured and weighed on a case-by-case
basis. 45 Certain types of cases invite suppression inquiries more
frequently than do other types. Requests often arise in cases relating
to medical malpractice, sex crimes, and child protection. More often
than not, courts will grant temporary name suppression at minimum
if requested by a party in one of these types of cases, at least while an
outcome is pending. 46
While New Zealand regularly grants temporary name
suppression requests, it does not do so thoughtlessly, because such
9
3

40

Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd. [2000] 3 NZLR 546 (CA) at para 41.
Id para 42.

41id.
42

id
43id.
44

Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd. [2000] 3 NZLR 546 (CA) at para 42.

See Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.) § 200 (listing the factors for courts to
consider when ordering suppression).
46 E.g., Bismark & Paterson, supra note 35 (discussing
the case of Dr. 1).
45
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grants can be lifted or modified. Further, grants of permanent
suppression are rarer events. In T v The Queen,47 the Court of Appeal
noted the infrequency of such an occurrence. 4 8 "We would not
normally extend name suppression just because of acquittal," 49 it
said. "But there are features to this case that are somewhat unique ...
In these somewhat unusual circumstances

. . . permanent name

50

suppression is justified."

A. Doctors Protect Their Patients;The Legal System Protects
Doctors
One of, if not the, most common contexts in which name
suppression requests are made and granted is that of medical
malpractice. This is largely due to New Zealand's concerns about the
ways that reputation can affect one's livelihood. 51 Medical
malpractice litigation has been virtually nonexistent in New Zealand
for nearly forty years; instead, patients may apply for compensation
through a no-fault government program. 52 All cases are initially
heard by the Medical Practitioners Disciplinary Tribunal ("MPDT");53
appeals go to the court system.5 4
Regardless of the venue, identifying a doctor who is under
investigation can pose a serious risk to the doctor's professional
reputation, so much so that hearings used to be privately held.55
However, the public viewed this policy as doctors being too lenient
to their own kind.5 6 Indeed, it is debatable as to which should take
precedence: a doctor's privacy interests and fear of harm to his
career, or the public's desire to know if a serious injury was caused
by the doctor in question. The Health and Disability Commissioner
typically makes this determination on an ad hoc basis and rules on
Tv The Queen [2010] NZCA 438 (CA).
Id. at paras 46, 48.
49 Id at para 46.
0
Id. at paras 46, 48.
51 See Bismark & Paterson, supra
note 35, at 115.
52
Id. at 117.
5 Id at 120.
54
See, e.g, id at 122.
47

48

56 Bismark
5

id.

& Paterson, supra note 35, at 120.
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name suppression accordingly. 57 An inquiry begins
presumption that publication is permissible:

67
with the

[t]he question is whether in the circumstances of the
particular case and on the evidence before the
Tribunal, it is desirable that publication should be
prohibited, in the sense that the considerations of
openness in the proceedings before the Tribunal, the
right of the media to report the result, freedom of
speech and the impact of section 14 of the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 are outweighed in the
particular case.58
When the circumstances of a case are tested against this
framework, a defendant doctor more often than not "wins"
suppression, 59 at least for the short term. More than fifty percent of
requests for temporary or permanent name suppression are granted;
however, only one third of the applications for private hearings are
approved. 60 This suggests that courts initially prefer to keep
proceedings public, before deciding that the parties to a case meet the
criteria for name suppression. Keeping proceedings public is
intended to help maintain the integrity of the disciplinary system and
the public's confidence in it.61
Concern for protecting doctors' livelihoods appears to be the
main reason for the high number of suppression requests that are
granted. The fact that cases are first heard by a tribunal may also be a
factor; 62 courts are publicly funded, which may contribute to people's
perception of having a right to know parties' names in court

See generally id. (explaining how name suppression works in the context of the
medical disciplinary system and providing the procedural history of one case as an
illustration).
58 C v Dir. of Human Rights Proceedings (unreported) High Court, Auckland, CIV2010-404-001662, 6 September 2010, Venning J at para 70 (N.Z.).
59 Bismark & Paterson, supra note 35, at 121.
60 Id.
57

Joanna Manning, Review: Health Care Law, Part] - Common Lv Developments
2004 NZ L. REV. 181, 199-200 (2004).
6

62

Id. at 204.

68
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proceedings. 63 In contrast, tribunals are more private. Further, one
may suppose that their decisions are more likely to be challenged.
The legal community does not want to casually publish the names of
doctors against whom allegations have gone unproven. 64
Ironically, however, publication is actually more desirable in
this venue than in court because a disciplinary hearing may be the
only opportunity for a medical complaint to be heard. 65 If a complaint
never makes it beyond this stage, then the public may never know
why certain physicians were reprimanded. This is a disservice to a
doctor's patients, who may want to change health care providers in
the wake of such a reprimand.
Regardless of whether the type of proceeding is a factor, the
body of medical cases dealing with name suppression is diverse. For
example, in C v Director of Human Rights Proceedings,66 a physician, C,
was charged with interfering with a patient's privacy. 67 A married
couple, both of whom were patients of C, was separated when the
husband gave C some confidential papers detailing his concern for
his estranged wife's mental health.68 The wife repeatedly asked C for
access to the papers, and he refused, citing confidentiality and
privilege.69 New Zealand's Privacy Commissioner determined that
C's denial of the wife's access to the papers constituted a violation of
Principle 6 of the Privacy Act. 70 The medical tribunal ultimately
awarded the wife damages and declined to suppress C's name, 7 '
stating that its decision was a message to doctors that they were not
immune to the Privacy Act 1993.72

63
64

id

Id. at 202.
61 Id at
206.
66 C v Dir. of Human Rights Proceedings (unreported)
High Court, Auckland, CIV2010-404-001662, 6 September 2010, Venning J (N.Z).
67
Id. at para 19.
68 Id at para
7.
69
Id. at paras 11, 13.
70
Id at para 22.
71 C v Dir. of Human Rights Proceedings (unreported) High Court, Auckland, CIV2010-404-001662, 6 September 2010, Venning J at paras 32, 35.
72 Id. at para 29 (referencing Privacy
Act 1993 (N.Z.)).

2012

NAME SUPPRESSION POLICIES

69

On appeal, the High Court noted that publication could have
devastating effects on both C's practice and his patients. 73 The court
further reasoned that the opinion itself would adequately serve as a
lesson to physicians and that publication of C's name added no
benefit to the decision. 74 It reduced the damages award and reversed
the refusal of suppression, instead granting C permanent name
suppression. 75
Name suppression has also been granted even when a
doctor's actions have grave physical consequences. The article
Naming, Blaming and Shaming? 76 provides an illustration. Dr. I's
patient visited her office twice in two days, and called on the third
day. 77 The doctor misdiagnosed her patient with pleurisy and
prescribed painkillers, sedatives, and anti-emetics.7 8 The patient died
at her home on the third evening from undetected pneumonia. 79 The
commissioner determined that Dr. I breached the patient's right to
receive treatment with reasonable care.80
Arguing that her reputation would be damaged even if she
were acquitted of the charges, Dr. I applied for interim name
suppression while the tribunal conducted its disciplinary proceedings. 81 The tribunal initially declined to grant Dr. I's request, but
the decision was overturned on appeal. 82 The tribunal then found the
doctor guilty of professional misconduct, and her name remained
suppressed while she appealed.8 3 The appellate court determined
that Dr. I's actions in this instance did not constitute professional

Id. at para 80.
Id at para 78.
7 Id. at para 89.
76 Bismark & Paterson, supra note 35.
77 Id. at 116.
7

74

78 id
79 id.

sold at 119.
81
82

Bismark & Paterson, supra note 35, at 122.

Id In upholding suppression of Dr. I's name, the judge noted that the doctor's

international reputation and her distinctive name-which was shared by her
children-were factors in his decision. Id
';'Id.at 124.

70
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misconduct and reversed the tribunal's decision. 84 Dr. I ultimately
received permanent name suppression.85
An acquittal, however, does not guarantee suppression.
Courts have discretion to decline to suppress party names in spite of
an acquittal. The court in Harman v MPDT86 allowed for publication
of acquitted defendant Harman's name, noting that doctors should
not receive preferential treatment simply because of their
reputations. 87 The court stated that "public interest requires
identification . . . . There also has to be public confidence in the
processes by which discipline is imposed . . . in the past disciplinary

proceedings [could]
profession."8 8

be

over-protective

of

members

of

the

B. Name Suppression Is Frequently Grantedin Sex Crimes Cases,
But Victims Increasingly Want to be Heard
In sex crimes cases, New Zealand courts generally give great
deference to the victims and tend to do what victims request in terms
of name suppression. This policy is wise for two reasons. First, it
allows for victims to feel some sense of control over their situation.
Second, knowing that their names can be published can serve as a
deterrent to potential perpetrators.
The Criminal Procedure Act 2011 specifies that the purpose
for broad name suppression in sex crimes cases is to protect
plaintiffs. 89 Many people may find it understandable that the legal
system wants to protect victims from the embarrassment or selfconsciousness that publication of their names may create. However,
victims themselves occasionally disagree with this policy, because
they would like for others to know what happened to them and who
caused them harm. Though the Criminal Justice Act 1985 made
suppression of victims' names automatic, 90 victims would sometimes
84

id

85 Id.
86

Harman v. MPDT (DC Auckland, NP No 4275/00, 3 May 2002, para 13) (citing in

Manning, supra note 61, at 200).
87

Id

88 Id.

Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.) §g 201, 203.
90 Criminal Justice Act 1985 (N.Z.) § 139.
89
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approach the media requesting publication of their names. 91 The Act
was amended in 2002 to allow for victims aged 16 years or older to
request non-suppression of their names. 92
Similarly, in incest cases, victims may request publication of
perpetrators' names.9 3 However, courts do not always wait to be
asked before they decide sua sponte to publish names, even when
they don't know if there are familial relations between the parties. 94
Thus, though victims can request publication and courts have
freedom to raise the issue on their own, it appears that defendants in
these cases have little influence on whether their names are
published.
The same can also be said about defendants in other types of
sex crimes cases. In Jackson v The Queen, 95 the plaintiff had been
protected by interim name suppression before his trial began. 96 He
had been charged with engaging in unlawful sexual conduct with an
11-year-old girl. 97 The court opined that the public interest in the
plaintiffs identity was very strong due to delays in the
commencement of his trial,98 and it ultimately chose to publish his
name.99
Other cases demonstrate the opposite result. In T v The
Queen,100 the plaintiff was charged with sexually exploiting a mentally impaired woman. T was initially charged with rape, but the
charge was reduced to exploitation, of which T was eventually
acquitted.101 The court determined that the unusual circumstances of
the case and the defendant's acquittal warranted permanent name

91

John Burrows, Review: Media Law, 2004 NZ L. REv. 787, 795 (2004).

92

id

93 id.

Criminal Justice Act 1985 (N.Z.) § 139(l)(b) (Section 139 of the Act is entirely
about name suppression in sexual offense cases. The statute is silent on the topic of
the relationship between the parties.).
9 Jackson v The Queen [2010] NZCA 506 (CA).
94

96

Id at para 17.
Id. at para 3.
98
Id at para 19.
99
Id. at paras 1, 22.
97

100Tv The Queen [2010] NZCA 438 (CA).
'1 Id.
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suppression.102 In many sex crimes cases, however, the victim will
play a role in the determination of whether a perpetrator's name is
made public.
C. Suppression Provides Anonymity for Children- and Reluctant
Parents
Another category of cases in which name suppression is
common is that of cases involving children. The reasoning is simple;
children are innocent and vulnerable, and courts want to protect their
well-being. This approach demonstrates a long-term consideration
for children's livelihoods. It can also serve to provide privacy to
involved parties during difficult times-for example, parents
engaged in divorce proceedings.
Yet suppression in these types of cases is not always
welcomed by the parties. In LNC v SX,103 the plaintiff took one of his
children to see a doctor at the District Health Board. The doctor wrote
and disseminated to several parties a letter suggesting that LNC was
a danger to his child. 104 The plaintiff was engaged in legal proceedings against his estranged wife, and the letter was detrimental to
his case. 105 He complained to the Privacy Commissioner about the
doctor. 106
LNC had some misgivings about New Zealand's family court
system and wanted open justice during the course of his
proceedings.1 07 He never agreed that his own name or the names of
any others involved should be suppressed; conversely, he suggested
that he wanted to actively seek publicity for his action against the
doctor that was pending hearing by the tribunal. 108 However, the
tribunal found it important for the plaintiffs child's name to be
suppressed. 109 To maintain the child's anonymity, the tribunal

102

Id. at 48.

103LNC v SX (2008) 24/08 HRRT 1/08.
104 Id. at para
2(c).
"oId at para 2(d).
106 Id. at para
2(e).
107

Id at para 3.

108Id

'09 LNC v SX (2008) 24/08 HRRT 1/08 at para 19.
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reasoned that both parents' names would need to remain unpublished as well, at least temporarily. 110
IV. THOUGH NAME SUPPRESSION IS LIBERALLY GRANTED, IT CAN BE
DENIED OR REVERSED

It appears that New Zealand's legal system grants name
suppression liberally. However, it does not always do so. Issues of
practicality often control; if, for example, a victim is going to testify,
then suppression may be pointless."' For example, in Re Victim X,112
a judge overturned his own earlier grant of suppression. He considered the public's high level of interest in the case and the fact that
publication might encourage other witnesses to identify themselves. 113 He also noted that the victim would be giving evidence. 114
The sum of these elements led the court to decide that the need for
open justice outweighed the victim's desire for privacy.115
The reason for which a party desires privacy is a frequent and
critical issue in many suppression decisions. Personal circumstances
are not always compelling in persuading a court to grant
suppression. In Jackson v the Queen,116 the plaintiff was a sex offender.
He requested name suppression due to the potential embarrassment
of his prominent family, the possible negative effects of the news on
his grandmother's ailing health, and the detrimental impact it would
have on a business deal in which he was engaged. 117 The court
determined that none of these reasons would suffice and accordingly
allowed for publication of his name.1 18

'o Id. at paras 20, 22(a).
I Burrows, supra note 91, at 796 (discussing Re Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220
(CA), in which the judge had planned to suppress the victim's name until he learned
that the victim would be appearing as a witness).
112 Re Victim X [2003] 3 NZLR 220 (CA) is discussed in Burrows, supra note 91, at
796.

113id.

id

114

1

"See id at 797.
' 16 Jackson v The Queen [2010] NZCA 506 (CA).
117
Id. at para 5.
81d at para 6.
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The defendant in The Queen v Yang 119 was charged with
corruption and bribery. She was granted temporary name suppression and went on to request permanent suppression. She pointed out
the practical effect of extending her temporary grant; because she had
not been identified to the public up until that point, a permanent
grant would be successful in achieving its purpose.120 The defendant
also argued that she planned to deed her business, a sole proprietorship, to her son, who was unaware of her legal transgression.121 She
further contended that she had not been convicted. 122 The case
against her was weak, and the witness on which the prosecution
relied at trial was in jail. 123
The court was unconvinced. It noted that "the balance must
come down clearly in favour of suppression" if suppression is to be
granted or upheld on a permanent basis.124 The defendant failed to
meet this threshold, 125 partly because nothing was unusual enough
about her case to distinguish it from other cases in which suppression
had been denied. 126 While the argument about the unreliable witness
had some weight, the court stated that "where there is smoke there is
usually fire." 127 In response to the defendant's novel argument about
the utility of continued suppression, the court replied that the
temporary grant was inconsequential because such grants are
regularly provided to ensure that defendants receive a fair trial.128
They have no impact on any prospective grants or orders. 129
Just as personal circumstances are unimportant to courts, so
are personal characteristics. The plaintiff in Lewis v Wilson & Horton

'9 The Queen v Yang (unreported) High Court, Auckland, CRI-2008-004-017744,
21 June 2010, Duffy J (N.Z.).
120 Id. at para
3(a).
121 Id. at para
3(c).
22
1 Id. at para 3(e).
123 Id at para
3(f).
124 The Queen v Yang (unreported) High Court,
Auckland, CRI-2008-004-017744,
21 June 2010, Duffy J at para 2 (N.Z.) (quoting Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd.
[2000] 3 NZLR 546 (CA)) (emphasis added).
125 Id at para
5.
126 Id. at para
4(b).
127 Id at para
10.
128 Id. at para
6.
129

id
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Ltd.130 was a successful businessman, philanthropist, and community
leader who had no criminal record. 131 However, the court was
unimpressed, stating that "successful and prominent members of the
community should [not] be in a privileged position." 132 Lewis did not
receive the name suppression he sought.133
V. NAME SUPPRESSION: A NOVELTY IN THE U.S. LEGAL SYSTEM

Name suppression, or pseudonymity as it is frequently called
in the United States, 134 is far less prevalent in this country than in
New Zealand. As one American court noted, "The question [of
pseudonymity] happily is one that is not too often raised . . .
relatively few cases .

.

.

have wrestled with the problem."s3 5 The

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure dictate that "an action must be
prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest," 136 barring
exceptions for executors, administrators, guardians, and the like.137
However, the rule is rarely invoked as governing authority,138 and
beyond this, no black letter law controls.139
The Supreme Court of the United States has never expressly
permitted name suppression; however, the implicit allowance of such
was demonstrated by allowing for the plaintiff in Roe v. Wade to
remain anonymous. 140 As evidenced by a search of American case

130Burrows, supra note 91, at 231 (discussing Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd. [2000]
3 NZLR 546 (CA)).
"'Id.
132 id
133 See id at 232 (discussing Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd. [2000] 3 NZLR 546
(CA)).
134 E.g., Doe v. Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Doe v. Shakur 164 F.R.D.
359 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (using terms such as "pseudonym," "pseudonomously," and

"pseudonymity.")
135 James
136

137

v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, 238 (4th DCA 1993).
Fed R. Civ. P. 17(a)(1).

id

Fed R. Civ. P. 17 is mentioned in cases such as Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. at 155.
However, courts do not cite the rule as a controlling factor in their decisions.
139 59 AM. JUR. 2D Parties § 18 (2011) provides factors for courts to consider in
138

making pseudonymity decisions. No statutory basis is given.
140 Jayne S. Ressler, Privacy, Plaintiffs, and Pseudonyms: The Anonymous Doe
Plaintiffin the InformationAge, 53 U. KAN. L. REv. 195, 212-13 (2004).
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law for lawsuits brought under pseudonyms, it appears that
pseudonymity is favored less than open justice. 141 Indeed, the
standard of review for the denial of a request for pseudonymity is
abuse of discretion.142 A decision will be overturned only if a court
has made an egregious error in allowing for publication of a party's
name.143

Pseudonymity in the United States is based on public policy,
common law, and the Constitution.1 44 The right to know party
identities is a logical outgrowth of the public's right of access to
judicial proceedings and records.145 This right is supported by the
First Amendment of the Constitution. 146 Lawsuits are public
proceedings, and the public has an interest in knowing the facts of
cases, including litigants' names.147
No law directly prohibits a litigant from attaining
pseudonymity in a legal proceeding. Indeed, neither the Federal
Rules themselves nor the Advisory Committee Notes for the rules
contain anything that expresses an intent to limit the ability to
proceed anonymously.148 Instead, different federal and state courts
have adopted various balancing tests to determine whether an
individual should be allowed to proceed with his case
anonymously. 149
A. American Pseudonymity Tests Illustrate a Variety of
Approaches
While New Zealand's name suppression cases occasionally
have surprising outcomes, the statutory scheme generally provides
In cases where pseudonymity is granted, such as Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154 and
Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233, courts often attach stipulations or conditions to the grants.
142 E.g., Unwitting Victim v. CS, 47 P.3d 392 (Kan. 2002).
143id
141

144

Id. at 400.

id

145
146 Del

Rio, 241 F.R.D. at 156.
id
148Doe v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464, 466 (E.D. Pa. 1997).
149 For example, the court in Does I Through XXIll v. Advanced
Textile Corp., 214
147See

F.3d 1058, 1068 (9th Cir. 2000) used a different balancing test than the court in
Shakur, 164 F.R.D. 359.
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for some predictability. However, the United States has no statutory
approach. Pseudonymity grants must be decided on a case-by-case
basis, and different jurisdictions take different approaches.
Academia has influenced law in this regard. Professor Joan
Steinman's research led her to develop a nine-factor balancing test
("the Steinman factors")1 50 which was later adopted by the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania. 151 The Steinman factors that favor
anonymity include: (1) the extent to which the litigant's identity has
been kept confidential; (2) the basis for the request; (3) the magnitude
of the public interest in maintaining the litigant's confidentiality;
(4) whether the litigant would still pursue legal action at the expense
of being publicly identified; and (5) whether the plaintiff is seeking to
sue pseudonymously. 152 Conversely, elements weighing against such
grants include a high level of interest in access to the litigant's
identity, as well as whether the motion for pseudonymity is illegitimately motivated.153

The Steinman factors do not constitute the only test; other
courts have developed their own balancing tests. For example, the
Ninth Circuit considers only three issues: (1) whether identification
creates a risk of retaliatory harm; (2) whether the preservation of
privacy is a necessity because the subject matter is "of a sensitive and
highly personal nature;" and (3) whether the party seeking anonymity would face legal prosecution if his or her identity were
revealed. 154 The Southern District of New York contemplates the
same factors, but also considers whether the plaintiff is challenging
governmental activity and whether the defendant would be
prejudiced by such a grant.155

o50
Joan Steinman, Public Trial, Pseudonymous Parties: When Should Litigants be
Permittedto Keep Their Identities Confidential?, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1985).
151 See, e.g., Provident Life, 176. F.R.D. 464.
152 Steinman, supra note 150, at 38-41.

Id at 41.

1
154Advanced
1

Textile Corp., 214 F.3d at 1068.

Shakur, 164 F.R.D. at 360-61.

U. MIAMI INT'L &COMP. L. REv.

78

V. 20

B. America's Body of Pseudonymity Cases Echoes That of New
Zealand
Though America has less pseudonymity case law than New
Zealand does, some patterns do emerge. A recurrent theme in the
United States is the "sensitive and highly personal nature" required
by the Ninth Circuit. 156 Consequently, pseudonymity requests are
often made in the context of cases relating to sexuality, birth control
and abortion, and welfare rights.15 7 Mental illness is also a frequentlynamed reason for such requests.158
For example, in the often-cited mental illness case of Doe v.
Provident Life and Accident Ins. Co., the plaintiff suffered from a variety
of emotional disorders.159 Despite receiving treatment, he left his job
and filed a claim with his insurance company for disability
benefits. 160 He sued the insurer when it denied his claim, requesting
pseudonymity in the course of the proceeding. 161
In that case, the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania noted that the Third Circuit did not have a
standard by which to gauge the plaintiffs request for anonymity, so
it chose to apply the Steinman factors. 162 It granted the request
largely due to a public policy concern about chilling access to courts
for those who have mental illnesses. 163 The court noted that pseudonymity would not impact the public's ability to follow the case,
because the trial itself would not be closed. 164 It also noted the
possible detrimental societal effects of denying the plaintiffs request,
such as the avoidance of litigation by others with mental illnesses due
to fear of being stigmatized. 165

E g., id at 361; Unwitting Victim, 47 P.3d at 397 (quoting Coe v. U.S. Dist. Court
for Dist. of Colo., 676 F.2d 411 (10th Cir. 1982)).
157E g., Unwitting Victim,
47 P.3d 392.
58 E.g., Provident Life, 176
F.R.D. 464.
15 Id at 465. (WestlawNext shows 30 citing references
for this case.)
160 id.
161Id at 466.
162

Id. at 467-469 (citing factors from Steinman, supra note 150).

163ProvidentLife,
164 id.
165id

176 F.R.D. at 468.
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Conversely, the Doe v. Heill 66 court considered the plaintiffs
personal plight rather than public policy. In that case, a convicted sex
offender claimed that he was being denied sex offender treatment -a
prerequisite for parole -and thus being denied due process.167 The
plaintiff requested pseudonymity because he was a member of the
general prison population, and had seen other sex offenders in that
population severely beaten. 168 He further argued that such a beating
would be extraordinarily harmful to him because he suffered from
congestive heart failure and depended on a pace maker. 169 The court
found that the preference for disclosure could be overcome by
demonstrating that the harm faced by an openly-identified plaintiff
would be greater than the harm of concealing his identity. 170
Applying this rule, it decided to grant the plaintiffs motion, subject
to the condition that defense counsel must be given his name and the
opportunity to respond with a counter-motion. 171
Other cases exist in which pseudonymity is granted, but these
grants are sometimes subject to restrictions. In James v. Jacobson,172 the
plaintiffs accused the defendant doctor, a fertility specialist, of
insemination a woman with his own sperm instead of that of her
husband. Prior to filing their lawsuit, the plaintiffs obtained an ex
parte order allowing them to use pseudonyms. 173 The defendant
moved to revise the order, complaining that it was unfair.174
In making its determination, the Fourth Circuit examined
commonly-assessed factors such as privacy, retaliation, and
fairness.175 It also considered the couple's offer to remain pseudonymous in name only -they had agreed to publicity in reference to
their location, professions, and other identifying features.176 Indeed,
Doe v. Heil, No. 08-cv-02342, 2008 WL 4889550, at *1 (D. Colo. Nov. 13,

166

2008).
167id.

Id at *2.

168

169id.

d at *3 (citing Doe v. City of Chicago, 360 F.3d 667 (7th Cir.2004)).
Heil, 2008 WL 4889550 at *4.
172 6 F.3d
233.
173 Id. at
235.
174Id at 236.
175 Id. at
238.
176Id at
241.
170
1
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the couple had asked the court for anonymity only to protect their
children, and suggested a jury instruction emphasizing that fact.177
These offers from the plaintiffs, as well as expert testimony about the
children's susceptibility to psychological harm, led the court to
endorse this approach.178
VI. THE AMERICAN SYSTEM CAN BE Too RESTRICTIVE
In America's quest for openness, the country is ultimately
restrictive- perhaps too restrictive -when it comes to protecting the
interests of its litigants. For every case in the United States in which
some degree of pseudonymity is granted, a case exists with the
opposite result. American courts have failed to provide anonymity
for parties even when the decisions of previous cases suggest that
protection would be warranted. This fact truly demonstrates the
differences between various circuits and the courts within those
circuits. With little case law to refer to, courts exhibit less consistency
than if they were bound to follow certain precedents, in contrast to
the predictability offered by New Zealand's statutory scheme.
The lack of a systemic approach in the United States has
created an uncertainty that may actually discourage parties from
seeking justice. In Doe v. Del Rio,179 the married plaintiffs claimed that
several police officers assaulted the husband and that an officer
sexually assaulted the wife. The court quickly found that the
husband did not have a strong argument for anonymity in his own
right, but only to protect his wife.180 The wife had requested to
proceed anonymously due to the social stigma attached to sexual
assault, as well as the psychological injury that would occur if she
were to be publicly identified. 181 The court considered the personal
nature of the subject matter of the case as well as potential injury to
the victim if she were to be publicly named in the lawsuit.182 It
reasoned that the allegations here were indistinguishable from those
177 Jacobson, 6 F.3d

at 241.
at 242.
179 Del Rio, 241 F.R.D.154.
sold at 159.
181 Id.
178 Id

182

Id at 159 61.
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in many other cases in which victims' names were public. 183
Moreover, it determined that any negative emotional impact on the
wife would likely be due to the litigation itself, rather than her public
identification. 184 The plaintiffs' request for pseudonymity was
ultimately denied. 185
Similarly, and arguably even more surprising, was the result
in a case in which the court dismissed the complaint without
allowing leave to amend. 186 The plaintiff had filed his lawsuit as
"Unwitting Victim," alleging that the defendant had knowingly
infected him with herpes. 187 Citing the stigma associated with
sexually transmitted diseases, the plaintiff claimed that being forced
to identify himself would be an extraordinary emotional burden.1 88
The Supreme Court of Kansas applied the Steinman factors1 89 and
determined that the circumstances were insufficient to warrant
pseudonymity. 190 While certain factors favored the plaintiff, the most
critical element was that he would face no greater social stigma than
would the defendant. 191 To allow the plaintiff to proceed
anonymously while naming the defendant would be unfair. 192 The
court went on to dismiss the lawsuit altogether due to procedural
missteps, rather than allowing the plaintiff to refile with his given
name. 193
Courts have also denied broader pseudonymity attempts
from legislatures. A number of states enacted "rape shield" laws
which punished the media for publication of an alleged rape victim's

183
18
4

Id. at 160.

Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. at 161.

..
5 Id. at 162.

186 Unwitting

Victim, P.3d at 402.
Id. at 395. The plaintiff also accused the defendant of appropriating funds without
permission and making him fear he had contracted AIDS. The plaintiff further
requested the return of the engagement ring he gave defendant or financial damages.
Id.
117

18

Id. at 396.

Steinman, supra note 150, at 38-41.
Victim, P.3d at 400-401.
191 Id. at 401.
192 Id
'93 Id at 402.
89

190 Unwitting
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name. 194 When the statutes were deemed unconstitutional, some of
the states tried instead to statutorily prevent the government from
disclosure of an alleged victim's identifying information. 195 These
statutes were also ruled unconstitutional on First Amendment
grounds. 196
These outcomes may appear surprising, if not outright unjust.
Rape victims have been denied statutory protection at a time when
they likely feel very vulnerable. Unwitting Victim was denied the
opportunity to proceed with his case even using his given name. This
was a purely discretionary choice of the court, as the Supreme Court
of Kansas noted. 197 Decisions like these show that United States'
desire for overall openness can result in individuals being treated
unjustly.
VII. NEW ZEALAND V. AMERICA: A COMPARISON OF NAME
SUPPRESSION POLICIES

Generally, New Zealand's approach to name suppression is
specific and rules-based, while the American approach is more ad
hoc. While there are basic similarities in the countries' pseudonymity
policies, the outcomes of name suppression requests are less
predictable in the United States than in New Zealand.
The foundations of suppression are similar between the two
countries. New Zealand's foundation is, largely, its Bill of Rights, 198
while the foundation for the United States is the Constitution. 199 In
addition, both countries- though there is no single test used by
American courts-use balancing tests to determine whether name
suppression should be granted in a given case. Beyond these
parallels, however, the countries' approaches diverge.

194 Daniel M. Murdock, A Compelling State Interest: Constructing a Statutory
Frameworkfor Protecting the Identity of Rape Victims, 58 ALAL. REV. 1177, 1178
(2007).
195
19

1180.

' Id. at 1180-81.
197 Unwitting Victim,

47 P.3d at 402.
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 at § 14.
199Unwitting Victim, 47 P.3d at 400.
198
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As noted, one major difference in the countries' policies lies
in the uniformity and predictability of their results. New Zealand's
national, uniform balancing test for name suppression arguably leads
to foreseeable results, at least most of the time. Conversely, the
variety of balancing tests in the United States often leads to
unpredictable results.
Indeed, some of New Zealand's critical balancing factors are
not accounted for in any way by American courts. For example, the
more likely it is for a defendant to be acquitted in New Zealand, the
more likely it is that the defendant's motion for name suppression
will be granted. 200 However, likelihood of acquittal does not appear
to be a factor in American cases. 201 The same can be said about
interest in the requestor's character and the likeliness of a convict's
rehabilitation. These factors are an important part of the name
suppression equation in New Zealand, 202 but are not mentioned in
the American pseudonymity opinions. 203
Conversely, one of New Zealand's factors, the gravity of the
offense, often is a factor in American pseudonymity decisions, albeit
in a different way. In New Zealand, the likelihood of publication
increases with the gravity of the offense. 204 Yet in the United States,
the seriousness of the offense is usually only assessed within the
same type of case.205 For example, the Doe v. Del Rio court acknowledged that "there is no such thing as a 'mere' or 'minor' forcible
indignity"; 206 however, "there are degrees of abuse . . . ."207 The court
there determined that, where a couple accused a police officer of
sexual misconduct, the case was unexceptional in comparison to
other cases with similar facts. 208 It did not look at the gravity of the
alleged actions as compared to other allegations across the spectrum

Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd. [2000] 3 NZLR

546 (CA) at para 42.
None of the American cases referenced herein specified that likelihood of
acquittal was a determining factor.
202 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd. [2000] 3 NZLR 546 (CA) at para 42.
203 None of the U.S. pseudonymity cases referenced herein
addressed these factors.
204 Lewis v Wilson & Horton Ltd. [2000] 3 NZLR 546 (CA) at para 42.
205 E.g., Del Rio, 241 F.R.D.
154.
206
200
201

Id. at 160.

207
208

Id.

id
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of legal cases. Rather, it compared that set of facts to other sets of
facts in sexual assault cases. 209
Courts in the United States view personal circumstances in a
similar manner -they look at cases within the context of other cases
of the same type. Any harm caused by the publication of one's name
needs to be greater than the usual degree of embarrassment or
distress. 210 This was part of the rationale for the Del Rio211 court's
denial of the plaintiffs' anonymity request. The court pointed out that
the cases cited by the plaintiffs "provide[d] no support for a right to
avoid public knowledge of possibly embarrassing facts . . . ."212 J
noted that loss-of-consortium claims often involve similar fact
patterns to the one at hand, and that plaintiffs in those cases regularly
file suit in their own names. 213 This demonstrates that the court again
viewed the consequences as compared with what it deemed similar
cases, as opposed to cases generally.
A. Public Policy Is a Compelling Factor in the United States
One larger-scale factor that plays a key role in American
grants of pseudonymity is public policy vis-A-vis fairness and
equality. 214 The plaintiff in Provident Life sued his insurance company
after he left his job due to mental health problems. 215 In granting the
plaintiffs motion, the court stated that society should not want to
discourage the mentally ill from seeking justice or exercising their
rights. 216
One might expect this same sort of rationale to appear in Del
217
Rio,
because society should have an interest in protecting its
citizens from violent crimes in which they are taken advantage of
sexually by police officers. Yet the court in that case never addressed
209

Id

210 See
211

Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. at 162.
Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154.

2 12

Id. at 160-61.

213

Id. at 161.

2 14

See generally Provident Life, 176 F.R.D. 464 (addressing the desire for mentally
ill people as a class to have equal access to the justice system).
2 15

Id. at 465.

216

Id. at 468.
Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. 154.

2 17
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this policy issue. Perhaps this is due to the fact that an alleged rape
necessarily entails accusing another person of a crime; maybe the
court felt that the other party deserved privacy and the assumption of
innocence until proven guilty.
At the same time, the absence of fault carries little weight in
the American legal system. One might expect Americans to be
generally more sympathetic towards those we find not to be at fault
in a given situation, but that conclusion appears to be incorrect. For
example, the plaintiffs' motion in James v. Jacobson218 was ultimately
granted, but under a stringent set of conditions. This was in spite of
the fact that the movants had no ability to prevent the doctor's
transgressions. The defendant physician had already been criminally
convicted of fraud for using his own sperm to impregnate some of his
patients. 219 But this mattered little; the court remanded and suggested
that plaintiffs' motion for pseudonymity be granted solely to protect
the identities of their children. 220 For the motion to meet the court's
approval, the plaintiffs had to stipulate to allow for all other aspects
of cross-examination. 221
New Zealand's treatment of public policy and fault contrasts
greatly with America's. Decisions there are either statutory 222 or
based on individual circumstances. 223 Outside of the medical system,
a public policy concern for equality and fairness generally does not
appear to be an overriding factor. 224 Fault, however, appears to be a
larger consideration, and blameworthiness can be a factor in deciding
to publish names. In The Queen v Yang, the court noted that "[t]he
public are entitled to know with whom they are dealing, including
whether someone has faced a criminal charge .... " 225
218
219
220

Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233.
Id at 235.

Id. at 241.

221 Id
222

at 242.
As specified by the Criminal Justice Act 1985 and the Criminal Procedure Act

2011.

E.g., Tv The Queen [2010] NZCA 438 (CA).
e.g., Jackson v The Queen, [2010] NZCA 506 (CA) (making no mention of
fairness or equality); but see Tv The Queen [2010] NZCA 438 (CA) (contemplating
223

224 See,

what is fair to the plaintiff).
225 The Queen v Yang (unreported) High
Court, Auckland, CRI-2008-004-017744,
21 June 2010, Duffy J, at para 4(e) (N.Z.).
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B. A Seeming Lack of Uniformity Leads to Varied Results
While name suppression decisions in New Zealand exhibit a
level of uniformity, the same cannot be said for the United States. The
differences in the balancing tests between countries - and even
among the individual United States - invite the conclusion that some
of the cases may have had different results if they were to be heard in
alternative jurisdictions. This is due to the fact that the tests are
subjective rather than objective. The Steinman factors use such
language as "undesirability" 226 and "magnitude," 227 which are flexible terms that demand interpretation. The Doe v. Del Rio court, in
discussing its factors, noted "the breadth of discretion to be
exercised." 228 Moreover, none of the tests cite a "reasonable person"
standard.229

New Zealand's C v Director of Human Rights ProceedingS230
may have turned out differently were it tried in the United States. In
that case, the physician had initially been reprimanded by the lower
court for causing his patient to feel "anger, humiliation and
betrayal" 231 when he would not let her see the information he had
about her. Only on appeal was the defendant granted name
suppression. 232 Conversely, it is difficult to imagine this case getting
past the trial stage in the United States based on the merits alone.
Confidentiality is a basic ethical duty owed by doctors to their
clients. 233 It is specifically mentioned in various iterations of the
Hippocratic Oath that is sworn by doctors in the practice of ethical

226

Steinman, supra note 150, at 40.

227

Id. at 38.

228

Del Rio, 241 F.R.D. at 157, n.4.

229 No

American case referenced herein made mention of such a standard.

230 C v Dir. of Human Rights Proceedings (unreported) High Court, Auckland,
CIV-

2010-404-001662, 6 September 2010, Venning J (N.Z.).
231 Id at para 31(a).
232 Id. at paras
89, 90.
233 E.g., American Medical Association, Declaration of Professional Responsibility,
available at http://www.ama-assn.org/resources/doc/ ethics/decofprofessional.pdf
(last accessed Dec. 21, 2012).
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medicine. 234 Hence, this case probably would never make it to trial in
the United States, much less the appeal stage.
Similarly, James v. Jacobson,235 in which an American court
granted limited pseudonymity to protect the plaintiffs' children,
presents a likely contrast in the two countries' name suppression
policies. A New Zealand court may have ordered name suppression
during that proceeding, as the American court did. Yet the reasoning
would probably be different. In the United States, the court suggested
granting the motion only to protect the couple's children. 236 In New
Zealand, a court would likely have acknowledged this important
rationale, and may also have decided that the couple deserved full
suppression due to the merits of the case. New Zealand courts have
granted suppression in cases they deem unusual in nature, 237 and this
case -with its doctor who purposely impregnated his patients with
his own sperm -would likely have been considered unusual.
Further, the sympathy the New Zealand lower court exhibited toward the patient in C v Director of Human Rights Proceedings,238
where the doctor did not show his patient confidential notes, also
suggests that some of the American cases would be decided
differently if they had been tried in New Zealand. For example, the
plaintiff in Unwitting Victim 239 was denied his motion for pseudonymity in part because the court determined that his embarrassment
was no greater than that the defendant would face. 240 In New
Zealand, not only might the plaintiff have been granted suppression,
but the defendant might have as well, if the court considered the
circumstances unusual enough to warrant it.241

E.g., Raphael Hulkower, Commentary, The History of the Hippocratic Oath:
Outdated, Inauthentic, and Yet Still Relevant, EINSTEIN J. BIOLOGY & MED. 41
(2010).
235 Jacobson, 6 F.3d
233.
236 Id. at
242.
237 E.g., Tv The Queen [2010]
NZCA 438 (CA).
238 C v Dir. of Human Rights Proceedings (unreported) High
Court, Auckland, CIV2010-404-001662, 6 September 2010, Venning J (N.Z.).
239 Unwitting Victim, 47 P.3d 392.
240 Id at 401.
241 See Tv The Queen [2010] NZCA 438 (CA) (explaining that
the circumstances of
the case were unusual enough to warrant suppression of the defendant's name).
234
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C. Open Justice and Privacy Can Coexist

Privacy is not always required for justice to be served.
Whether privacy is more important than-or even has an impact
on-open justice is decided on an ad hoc basis. But if the cited cases
are indicative of a larger trend, the United States has demonstrated
an inclination toward open justice. This contrasts with New
Zealand's more centrist approach which looks to balance both values.
Privacy and open justice do not have to be oppositional
concepts. James v. Jacobson242 shows that privacy and open justice can
coexist-not only in a court system, but in a single case. There, the
plaintiffs initially learned about fraud-related criminal charges
against the defendant via media reports. 243 After seeing news
coverage about their physician, the plaintiffs decided to have their
children genetically tested; the results revealed that the doctor was
virtually certain to be the children's father. 244 The media's willingness
to name names, and the law's tolerance for it, was what allowed the
couple to seek justice.
In addition to the media, both the court and the plaintiffs in
Jacobson also appeared to have favored open justice; pseudonymity
was suggested only to protect the identity of the couple's children. 245
The court was very clear on this point, and the couple willingly
agreed. This case demonstrates that it is possible to both protect the
identities of the innocent and allow for the public to stay informed.
More creative outcomes like this would show that American courts
are truly trying to come to a correct decision in pseudonymity cases.
D. Publicity, While Not Controlling, Can Have Undesirable
Results

However, a preference for broad, open justice may violate the
adage "innocent until proven guilty." The United Nations' Universal

242

Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233.

243

Id. at 235.

244

id
Id. at 242.
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Declaration of Human RightS246 has adopted this tenet, declaring that
everyone charged with a penal offense shall be considered innocent
until proven otherwise in a public trial. 247 The declaration does not
apply to civil cases, but a U.N. directive still carries great weight for
its member countries. 248 The denial of a pseudonymity request can
impact whether someone is truly treated as innocent until he is
proven guilty; while he may be treated as innocent in a court of law,
the court of public opinion is not always so accommodating. This can
be particularly true for parties who are famous.
The results of fame can be unpleasant in a legal proceeding
for both the involved party and for the public. Yet to allow for that
circumstance to be controlling would be an affront to the justice
system. While New Zealand more liberally allows for suppression
when one's livelihood is at stake, it does not do so merely because a
party's fame makes being named at trial more burdensome. 249 In this
regard, the United States and New Zealand are aligned.
New Zealanders are concerned about the impact of lawsuits
on professionals' livelihoods, 250 as is demonstrated by the country's
medical decisions. 251 However, similarly to America, fame is not a
critical factor in deciding whether one's livelihood will be affected by
the publicity of a public trial. In Re Victim X,252 the well-known son of
a prominent businessman was kidnapped. The court expressed
sympathy for the family's situation yet lifted the temporary
suppression order after deciding that the situation was not
extraordinary enough to displace the default notion of open justice.253
In alignment with this principle, New Zealand's new legislation
246

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.

A/RES/217(111) (Dec. 10, 1948).
247 Id at Art.
11.
248 UN Charter art. 4, para. I says that members need to be
"able and willing to carry
out [their] obligations," which implicitly suggests that members should generally
abide by the "innocent until proven guilty" tenet no matter the type of case.
249 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.) § 200 ("The fact
that a defendant is well
known does not, of itself, mean that publication of his or her name will result in
extreme hardship . . . .")
250 E.g., Bismark & Paterson, supra
note 35, at 123.
251 See generally id (illustrating
one example).
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specifically states "[t]he fact that a defendant is well known does not,
of itself, mean that publication of his or her name will result in
extreme hardship ....
And so it is with the United States, as evidenced by the
aforementioned story of Casey Anthony. A defendant's profiting or
suffering are not concerns of the legal system. Moreover, the
American courts are not concerned with granting pseudonymity
when it has not been requested. Because Anthony never requested
pseudonymity, the court would have needed to decide sua sponte if
any of the parties' or participants' names should have been
suppressed.
This sort of action has been taken in New Zealand, as LNC v.
SX 255 demonstrates. There, a father wanted his name to be public, but
the New Zealand tribunal decided to suppress, even though it was
contrary to his wishes. 256 Yet it is difficult to imagine a court
ordering pseudonymity sua sponte in the United States; none of the
American cases researched for this article mentioned such grants.257
Perhaps the likelihood of such an occurrence would increase if the
United States handled certain types of cases systemically, in the
manner that New Zealand does with its medical cases. Of course, the
fact that this does not occur regularly makes it difficult to conjecture.
VIII. CONCLUSION

In The Queen v Yang, the defendant claimed that permanent
name suppression would continue to serve the purpose of temporary
suppression, as evidenced by the fact that no one yet knew she had
committed a crime.258 This reasoning is logically sound and probably

Criminal Procedure Act 2011 § 200. While extreme hardship is not required for a
court to determine that name suppression is appropriate, it is a compelling factor in
making such a decision.
255 LNVC v SX (2008) 24/08 HRRT 1/08.
256 id
257 Each of the American cases cited herein was brought at
the request of one of the
parties.
258 The Queen v Yang (unreported) High Court, Auckland, CRI-2008-004-017744,
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21 June 2010, Duffy J, at para 3(a) (N.Z.).
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applies to most permanent suppression requests. Yet in other cases,
parties have not argued this point. 259
Perhaps this is due to the fact that continued anonymity is not
reason enough for courts to grant name suppression. Though the
tests vary and the outcomes of cases can be surprising, name
suppression comes down to one thing: justice. Suppression should be
granted when justice requires a party's identity to be withheld,
whether it is because an accusation may permanently damage the
party's livelihood, 260 or because a unique health condition makes the
party more susceptible than most to injury. 261
New Zealand's current name suppression policies may seem
overly liberal, and at the same time, the United States' policies may
seem overly rigid. But the new act in New Zealand is primed to
create the proper balance between privacy, fairness, and open justice
by balancing factors such as reputation, prejudice, and the public
good. 262 It is poised to be more objective and predictable than the
previous act, while still being humane, with a focus on hardship to
individuals. 263 The United States would do well to see how the new
act impacts New Zealand's legal system and learn from it. A more
predictable and fair U.S. approach to pseudonymity would not only
create greater efficiency within our legal system, but it may also help
promote justice in instances when it would not otherwise be sought.

The Queen v Yang is the only case referenced herein in which a party requested
name suppression on this basis.
260 E.g., Bismark & Paterson, supra note 35 (discussing
the case of Dr I.).
261 E g, Heil, 2008 WL
4889550.
262 Criminal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.) §§ 200,
201, 203, 205.
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